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CHANGING NAVAL OPERATIONS
AND MILITARY INTERVENTION
Michael MccGwire
Navies have long been a means of
bringing military force to bear in distant
parts of the world, and the purpose of
this paper is to consider the impact of
contemporary developments on this traditional instrument of great power
policy_
In a naval context, military intervention can include a cocktail party in
Mombasa, a show of force in the Caribbean, naval interposition off Iceland,
carrier airstrikes on Hanoi, or the landing of marines in the Persian Gulf. I
have chosen to concentrate on the
application of force as opposed to the
display cf force, for two reasons. First,
our understanding of the processes
underlying political influence building is
still unclear, l and becomes even more
so when we introduce the diffuse concept of "a naval presence.,,2 And
second, to the extent that a naval

presence does have any political influence, this must stem from the ultimate
possibility that the forces involved will
actually be used.
This discussion of military intervention both at sea and by sea stops
short at the beachhead, and military
activity on land is only addressed to the
extent that it is relevant to maritime
operations. Similarly, although I touch
on the political costs of naval intervention, the more general question of the
political utility of military force is not
addressed because of limitations of
space.
However, so many assumptions
about the contemporary role of force at
sea stem from centuries past, that it is
worth spending a moment on the relevant changes in the international
environment. Mahan, who chose the
term "seapower" for its evocative ring
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rather than its usefulness dS an analytical term, saw it as one of three interlocking circles, the other two being
colonies and commerce. His theories
about seapower and command of the
sea derived from an historical analysis of
the years 1660-1783, the height of
mercantilism and monopoly trade, and
were thought to have been validated by
what G.S. Graham terms "The Illusion
of Pax Britannica" in the 19th century.3 But British naval power was not
the sole or even the most important
reason for the Pax Britannica, which
resulted from a combination of various
factors. Of these, the most important
was "Britain's industrial supremacy,
which made possible a phenomenal
commercial development.,,4 The period
of the industrial revolution provided
both the means and the stimulus for
Western nations to establish more or less
effective dominion over a world which
seemed to lack viable political entities.
The process was accompanied by the
spread of a Western administrative infrastructure (part government, part commercial), throughout much of the
world, and was supported by a belief in
"la mission civilatrice" and "the white
man's burden," and Victorian ideas
about child rearing and colonial government. Among the most important were
the will to empire, the readiness of the
imperial authorities to use force, and
the knowledge of their subject people
that resistance would lead to certain
retribution, even if delayed. God was
white and to spare the rod, spoiled the
child.
Navies were prime instruments of
such imperial retribution, and in those
days of coal-fired ships and manually
operated gun mountings, sizable bodies
of well·armed men could be landed at
short notice, while the warship lay
virtually invulnerable offshore. As
recently as the Boer War, it was still
practical to dismount naval guns and
drag them by oxcart to the battlefront.
By World War I, attitudes toward

empire were already changing, and the
Western imperial tide had begun to
recede. But even in the thirties it was
thought unexceptionable to bomb
villagers in the Aden Protectorate as a
form of collective punishment, and on
the shores of the Malaysian Archipelago
and the China Seas, villages were razed
as a discouragement to piracy.
Since the last war, attitudes and
circumstances have changed radically.
Of the latter, the most significant would
seem to be the proliferation of nationstates and their membership in the
United Nations. The corollary of this
has been the progressiv~ dismantling of
the infrastructure of colonial occupation, which played such an important
role in bringing imperial retribution to
bear. There has also been a change in
general attitude;; towards the acceptability of coercive force. The circumstances in which long·range intervention
is likely to be acceptable have been
progressively circumscribed, and in the
last 30 years, large-scale coercive intervention by major powers has been
successful only within their respective
contiguous national security zones,
where power gradients and political
commitment are both high. Effective
intervention overseas now requires an
initial favorable balance of political
forces in the "host" country, as well as
sufficient weight of sustained response.
But even if attitudes had not changed,
warships would no longer be able to
serve as the autonomous wielders of
graduated retribution. The specialized
demands of modern warfare mean that
naval units now lack the military flexibility of the prewar general purpose
cruiser, with its numerous guns and
comfortably large ship's company.
Meanwhile, the proliferation of sophisticated weapon systems means that no
longer are warships necessarily invulnerable when lying offshore. Sensors may
have to be manned continuously with
weapons ready at standby alert, and it
may be hard to spare a landing party
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without hazarding one's ship. The
modern equivalent of the cruiser with
its landing party is the carrier task force
and its marine battalion landing team.
But while the political effect that each
could achieve may be comparable, the
political stake is obviously very different.
None of this means that military
intervention by sea is no longer likely or
possible. But it has placed constraints
on the almost casual use of force which
used to be the norm. And it does mean
that the economic and political costs are
likely to be very much higher, and that
the chances of a successful outcome are
far less. However, while the utility of
coercive force is increasingly in question, the threat of such force remains a
powerful diplomatic weapon. Irrespective of whether it ultimately achieves its
goals, coercive intervention is an unpleasant experience for the target country, and a credible threat is likely to
introduce some element of deterrence
to its political considerations.
There are two separate calculations
involved in assessing the level of capability required for a successful intervention overseas. First, there is the level
and type of force which is to be brought
to bear on the target ashore, whether it
be naval bombardment, carrier airstrike,
or men and tanks. And second, there is
the capability required to get such a
force to the target area by sea, and to
sustain offshore operations as necessary.
Our concern is with the second category, which includes the possibility that
passage may be deliberately obstructed,
and may require the use of force to
secure such passage. The policymaker
will want to know the political costs of
such ancillary operations, and how they
compare with the political benefits that
the major intervention is supposed to
achieve.
Maritime intervention is a complex
subject, and I therefore begin by developing a discussion framework which
allows us to consider the level of

capabilities and the types of cost involved. I then look at the major operational developments and their likely
effect on military intervention by sea,
before turning to review the different
types of intervention and why they
could occur. Finally, I consider certain
differences between the Soviet and the
U.S. approaches to overseas intervention.
The Use of the Sea-A Theoretical
Framework. The sea's strategic quality
derives from the access it provides to
nonadjacent areas. Maritime strategy is
therefore about the use of the sea; using
it for one's own advantage and preventing its use to one's disadvantage, in
peacetime as in war. This navigational
use of the sea breaks down into two
main categories: (1) the conveyance of
goods and people, and (2) the projection of military force against targets
ashore.
The first category of use covers
seaborne trade, which in a strategic
context spells maritime communications. It also covers the movement of
military cargoes in merchant ships,
although this shades into the second
category, particularly when a war is
actually in progress. The shading is
inevitable, since the military and commercial uses of the sea form a continuum. While we can identify what is
purely military, there are few commercial cargoes which have no military
value. For analytical purposes, therefore, it is impractical to distinguish
between military and nonmilitary uses
of the sea, except in the broadest terms,
whereas the projection of force, and the
conveyance of goods and people are
functionally distinct.
The second category has two forms:
the traditional one of bringing military
force (actual or latent) to bear on
coastal states; and the deterrent form of
targeting distant land areas with nuclear
weapons. We are here only concerned
with the traditional form. This may
involve the landing of troops or may be
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limited to standing offshore and striking
targets with shipbome weapons such as
guns, missiles or aircraft.
There is also a third, instrumental
category: (3) the deployment of naval
forces in order either (a) to prevent, or
(b) to secure the two main categories of
use. We all know that certain types of
naval units also embody the capability
for projecting force ashore, but the
analytical distinction between categories
(2) and (3) is worth preserving. It serves
to emphasize that maritime strategy is
wholly about the use of the sea and
only incidentally about the use of force
at sea. Naval forces are only necessary
to the use of the sea if attempts are
being made to prevent it.
The ease with which use can be
prevented depends on maritime geog·
raphy and the type of use involved. A
waterway (defined as any stretch of sea
used for passage) can be described in
terms of its geographic characteristics,
lying somewhere on the continuum
between narrow, shallow waters and the
deep ocean. Narrow waterways, where
ships must pass close to shore-based
weapons, are relatively easy to obstruct,
particularly if they are shallow and
hence minable. It is much harder to
prevent passage across an ocean waterway, out of range of land and with
opportunities for evasive routing. By the
same token, different types of use involve different capabilities and lengths
of time at risk. It is usually easier to
interrupt a flow of merchant shipping,
than to prevent the passage of a naval
task force.
As a general rule, it is also easier to
prevent the use of the sea than it is to
secure such use. This is partly because
the means of preventing use are not
limited to naval forces, and in narrow
waters they include the simple blockship, the mine and a whole range of
shore-based weapons. Naval forces are
more important on the ocean waterways, the submarine being the most
universal long-range weapon, but even

here the task of preventing use can be
shared by land-based strike aircraft and
supported by satellite and shore-based
surveillance systems.
However, securing the use of the sea
against opposition remains a predominantly naval task, at least the military
means are primarily naval. There are, of
course, other ways of securing use,
including diplomatic pressure and economic sanctions.
We are now in a position to draw a
box diagram, plotting the type of waterway against the type of use, and in each
box we can show the minimum capability needed to prevent the use of the
sea in such circumstances. We are not
able to show the level of capability
needed to secure the use of the sea,
since this will also depend on the type
and scale of opposition, which will vary
between cases. However, we can show
the type of costs which will be incurred
in using military force to secure the use
of the sea against opposition.
These costs can be economic, in the
sense of increased demands on the
domestic economy for defense expenditure; or they can be political in the
sense of adversely affecting relations
with other states. The type of cost is
determined by the strategic quality of
the waterway. In the case of narrow
waters, it is geopolitical, in the sense
that it stems from a combination of
geographical configuration and the
political control of the adjacent coasts.
A military response to an attempt to
prevent passage through narrow waters
therefore cannot avoid political costs
and these will tend to be heavy, because
it will usually require attacks on national territory.
The strategic quality of ocean waterways is primarily military, and stems
from the reach and geographical distribution of maritime forces, and their
relative capabilities in the encounter
zone. The costs of the military response
to an attempt to prevent passage across
the ocean are primarily economic and,
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in the international context, the response can usually be contained politically, unless it becomes essential to
attack shore-based support facilities.
Between these two extremes lie those
waterways which traverse open seas
within range of land-based weapon and
surveillance systems, where the strategic
quality will be some mix of military and
geopolitical, and the costs part economic and part political.
In the same context of securing use,
there is a distinction to be made between the "terminal" and "passage" legs
of a waterway. Obviously, the terminal
of one voyage can be the passage of
another, and the distinction will lie in
the mind of the user. But it is somewhat
akin to the distinction between ends
and means and, depending on which
applies, it influences the relative ease
with which use can be prevented, the
range of options open to the user, the
costs of securing use, and the levels of
political commitment.
The point of immediate interest is
that very rarely is the passage leg the
only route between two terminals. It is
therefore usually possible to divert

round obstructions to narrow waterways, and although ocean waterways are
more difficult (because the obstructions
are mobile) some form of evasive routing is often practicable. This means that
there is usually an alternative to insisting on passage, and consideration can
be given to the relative costs.
The extra distance involved in
accepting diversion can be expressed in
time and money, and this also will
translate into economic and political
costs. But in this case, the political costs
will reflect lost opportunities to influence events, or the inability to meet an
important commitment. Political costs
of this type will only be incurred when
timeliness is an issue, as, for example, if
it involves the deployment of military
force in response to a sudden crisis, or
the supply of a distant battlefront by
sea at the outbreak of a war.
Our diagram is now complete. The
boxes for Trade in the Terminal area
have been left blank to show that in
most cases the coastal state will be
concerned to secure rather than prevent such use of the sea. Where local
conflict prevents such use, Trade and
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Military Supply would have the same
indexes. The political costs of securing
use in Terminal areas are not shown,
since they cannot be separated from
the larger costs of the military intervention.
The diagram shows the minimum
level of military capability needed to
prevent use in the different situations.
The assessment is intuitive, and I have
arbitrarily divided military capability
into six levels, reflecting both the range
to which violence can be projected, and
the degree. Level I (the highest) implies
the capability for sustained attack on
naval forces in midocean, and is
possessed only by the United States
and, in certain sea areas, by the Soviet
Union. Level II implies a lesser capability which could attack a strong naval
force, but not sustain an engagement.
Britain has this capability in much of
the Atlantic, and China is moving
towards this in the Asian-Pacific.
Moving to the bottom end of the scale,
Level VI implies the ability to prevent
the passage of merchant ships through
narrow shallow waters, perhaps using
contact mines laid by junks or dhows
and protecting them from being swept
with field artillery. Level V would be
able to prevent passage through less
constricted waters and might include
torpedo and gun-armed coastal patrol
craft. Levels IV and III lie in between
these two pairs. Level IV could cover
broader, deep-water straits and would
include missile-armed craft and coastal
installations, and a measure of shorebased air support. Level III implies a
greater offshore capability, either including submarines or else reasonably
effective surface forces, backed by
shore-based airstrike.
These descriptions are deliberately
vague, because military forces tend to
be unbalanced and do not lie tidily
along a smooth continuum of capability. The levels do however give some
idea of the leverage provided by maritime geography, and the extent to

which passage can now be controlled by
coastal states in general, and straits
states in particular.
Operational Developments. Turning
to the operational factors affecting
maritime intervention, there have been
significant developments in four main
areas: advances in weapons technology,
the dispersion of weapon systems
among nonindustrialized states, the
Soviet Navy's shift to forward deployment, and international attitudes
towards the rights of maritime passage.
The last of these is of a different kind to
the other three, and will be disposed of
first.
(1) Erosion of Rights of Passage.
Since the first two U.N. Conferences on
the Law of the Sea in 1958 and 1960,
there has been a remarkable shift in
world opinion concerning the balance
between exclusive and. inclusive use of
the sea. In 1958, the "traditional maritime powers" were still fighting for a
3-mile territorial limit, and the South
Americans claim for 200 miles was seen
as preposterous. In 1960, the compromise proposal for a 6-mile Territorial
Sea, with an additional 6-mile Exclusive
Fishing Zone failed by one vote to get
the necessary two-thirds majority. And
yet by 1974, most nations, including
the major maritime powers, had come
to accept the much broader concepts of
a 12-mile Territorial Sea and a 200-mile
Exclusive Economic Zone, and argument focused on the scope of national
jurisdiction within that zone. This
tendency has been reinforced by claims
that archipelagic seas should be considered ,as internal waters, and that
marine pollution could threaten the
security of a coastal state. The dominating principle of "freedom of the
seas" has now been seriously eroded,
and specific claims have undermined
both the concept and the right of
"innocent passage" through territorial
waters.
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A new regime of "transit passage"
may yet emerge, but the net effect of
these developments has been to make it
more likely that in the future, coastal
states will challenge or even deny the
right of passage to certain .categories of
ships through waters coming within
their various jurisdictions. It is also
likely that such action will be seen as
legitimate by many other countries,
including perhaps the hundred or so
members of the Group of 77. Passage
through the Suez Canal and the Straits
of Tiran were denied to Israel in the
past, and would serve as a precedent in
the future.
(2) Advances in Weapons Technology. Such challenges to passage will
be all the more threatening because of
advances in weapons technology and the
dispersion of sophisticated systems
among coastal states. The former have
enabled quantum jumps in such fundamental weapon characteristics as range,
accuracy, payload and systems reliability. These have been matched by an
exponential increase in the capabilities
of sensor and surveillance systems.
By depriving the seas of their
capacity for concealment, the improved
surveillance systems have simplified the
problems of ocean interception by warships.\ They can also provide the target
location data which allow long-range
weapon systems to be brought to bear.
Tactical systems with ranges from 300
miles (cruise missiles) to 1,500 miles
(aircraft) have been in service since the
end of the fifties, but the emerging
capability to strike moving targets with
ballistic missiles at intercontinental
ranges is introducing a new dimension
to maritime warfare. As long ago as
1972, the Soviet Union claimed that
"naval groupings" were targeted by the
Strategic Rocket Forces,s and we know
that they are developing a homing reentry vehicle for a medium-range
ballistic missile. 6 We are now moving
into an era where maritime warfare will

be fought as much by land- as sea-based
weapon and sensor systems, and it is
becoming necessary to distinguish between the "reach" of different systems
and to think in terms of "global" and
(for want of a better term) "local"
systems. In the middle ranges, such
distinction will be somewhat arbitrary,
but it becomes clearer if we allow that
"reach" covers response time as well as
range. Thus an IRBM would come
within global systems, while a mediumrange bomber would be at the high end
of the local systems. Perhaps more
important is the concept that "global"
systems are of a kind that can be
launched from national territory (or
from a strategically located submarine),
to strike like a bolt from the blue at
maritime targets in distant sea areas,
across intervening seas or territory,
whereas "local" system implies a more
direct relationship between adversaries.
Global systems will be extremely sophisticated and expensive, and in the main
they are likely to be limited to the
superpowers. Several components for
such systems are already in service, and
it seems clear that the Soviet Union (at
least) intends to adopt an integrated "all
arms" approach to maritime warfare.
While the global systems introduce a
new dimension, improvements in local
systems have been equally dramatic.
The main instrument has been the
terminally guided cruise missile, which
allows a patrol craft to pack the punch
of a battleship, and can be fitted to
aircraft, surface ship, submarine or
coastal defense installation. As important as the accuracy and payload of
this weapon, is its range. This not only
extends a coastal state's reach seaward,
but the greater the range, the smaller
the number of weapon platforms
needed to cover a given sea area or
stretch of coast.
The homing cruise missile can be a
deadly weapon against an undefended
or unalerted target. But once the threat
was properly assessed, it was
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appreciated that in many ways the
cruise missile simplified the defense
problem. Early missiles were transsonic,
and provided a reasonably homogeneous
target which, within the existing state of
the art, could be shot down or seduced.
In many ways this compared favorably
with the previous situation, where the
weapon was a torpedo, shell or bomb,
whose flight could not be arrested.
Effective defense was therefore predicated on the destruction of the weapon
platforms (submarine, surface ship or
aircraft) prior to weapon launch, which
was a very demanding requirement. The
weakness of these systems had been
their inaccuracy, but in the case of
bombs and shells, this can now be
overcome by the use of precision-guided
munitions (PGM), which home on the
designated target. Of course, the terminally guided cruise missile remains a
serious threat, and later generations are
supersonic, harder to detect and more
difficult to decoy or shoot down.
So far, only strike systems have been
referred to, but there have also been
considerable advances in counterstrike or
"protect" systems. These include electronic countermeasures (ECM), image
masking and so forth, as well as weapons
designed primarily for shipboard selfdefense. We have here the classic contest
between attack and defense, and up to
now it has been fairly evenly matched.
But the advent of the tactical ballistic
nrlssile and the prospect that it may be
mounted in surface ship, submarine and
ashore for use against maritime targets,
raises the requirements for shipboard
self-protection to new levels which will
be hard to achieve. These ballistic strike
systems' will be expensive and therefore
reserved for high·value targets, but it does
prompt the question of whether traditional surface warships will be able, in the
future, to survive in a hostile maritime
environment.
(3) Dispersion of Weapon Systems
Among Coastal States. These high

technology developments relate mainly
to confrontations between the two
superpowers in the context of general
war. But since 1955, the industrialized
powers have provided a steady supply of
sophisticated weapons to emerging
nations. Whatever the motives behind
this supply, the effect has been to
increase the ability of these nations to
defend themselves against external intervention and, in several cases, to prevent
the use of their coastal seas. As an
indicator of the latter capability, by
1976 about 23 nonindustrialized states
had been supplied with missile-armed
surface units (or missile systems for
retrofitting), 10 by the Soviet Union
and 13 by the West; 14 such states had
been supplied V{i.th submarines, 4 by the
Soviet Union and 10 by the West, 6 of
the latter being in South America. 7
These are by no means the only type of
weapon which can be used to prevent
the use of the sea, and besides other
naval forces like torpedo boats and
gun·armed surface units, there is the
whole range of shore·based systems such
as aircraft, missiles and coastal batteries,
and fixed obstr~ctions such as mines.
And all these weapons are being progressively upgraded. In the case of supplies from the West, this is largely for
commercial reasons. In the case of
Russia, this is a byproduct of her
economic system, which allocates a
:fIXed share of resources to weapons
procurement, resulting in the periodic
replacement of all equipment by improved versions. In this context, the
Soviet SS-N-3 300.,rnile surface-tosurface antishipping cruise missile will
be superseded by the end of the seventies, and may become available for
selective supply to client states for coast
defense purposes.
The supply of weapons is one thing,
their effective use is another, and this is
why maritime geography plays such an
important role in determining a coastal
state's ability to prevent the use of its
waters. It requires an experienced
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submarine commander to bring a diesel
boat within torpedo range of a target in
open waters. And while range is not so
great a problem to missile-armed patrol
craft, they are very exposed to counterattack when away from the cover of
land, and the state of the sea affects
their operational performance. Mines
are a cheap and simple way of preventing use, but they can only be laid in
relatively shallow depths, and are only
effective if they cannot be circumvented
or swept, factors which depend largely
on the breadth of the waters.
There is also the complex matter of
what is needed for a nation to maintain
and operate the weapons it possesses.
We have the example of the buildup and
decline of Indonesia's Navy, and the
limited effectiveness of the Egyptian
force, even though both nations have a
seafaring tradition. The rapid deterioration of the Indonesian Navy was mainly
a failure of maintenance, the lack of
spare parts being a subsequent cause,
and this underlines the problems of
keeping complex equipment operational, particularly in hot and humid
climates. When this is coupled with such
evidence as the apparent superiority of
Israeli pilots over their Egyptian
opponents, one begins to ask whether a
country requires some minimal technological base in order to make effective
use of the latest weapons. On the other
hand, North Vietnamese air defense
units inflicted heavy casualties on the
latest American aircraft, which suggests
that perhaps it is as much a matter of
priorities and commitment, as of innate
capability. Meanwhile, the trend in
weapon design appears to be towards
increasing internal sophistication,
matched by a greater simplicity in
operation and maintenance, and this
may come to compensate for the technological constraints.
(4) The Soviet Navy's Shift to Forward Deployment. The fourth major
development has been the Soviet Navy's

shift to forward deployment. Although
this has received the most publicity, in
practical terms it seems to have had
little real effect on either the capability
or the willingness of the West to use
their navies in support of military intervention overseas. If anything, the last 10
years has seen an increase in such
activity. The presence of Soviet naval
units in distant sea areas must obviously
introduce a complicating factor to U.S.
plans and impose costs in terms of
higher states of readiness and increased
surveillance requirements. But it has
certainly not prevented America from
active naval intervention, as we saw in
the Jordanian crisis in 1970, the Indian
Ocean deployments in 1971 and 1973,
both Arab-Israeli conflicts and throughout the war in Vietnam. Commentators
who insist to the contrary tend to
disregard the rise of nationalism, the
Western withdrawal from empire, and
the diminishing utility of coercive intervention, and they ascribe the results of
these historical trends to the presence of
a few Soviet warships. Given the opportunities, Soviet gains have been remarkably few.
It is now generally accepted that the
primary determinant of the Soviet decision that their navy should shift to
forward deployment, was the sharp
acceleration in strategic weapons procurement, ordered by President Kennedy on taking office, and the marked
increase in the emphasis on sea-based
systems. This generated a Soviet requirement to deploy a counter against this
threat to Russia from the "maritime
axes," and resulted in the radical restructuring of the Soviet Navy.
The carrier threat, which had been
the Soviet Navy's primary concern since
1955, yielded precedence to the threat
from Polaris, and since 1961, antisubmarine warfare (ASW) has received
top priority in research and development and in warship design. Between
1957-1967, naval new construction
entering service was heavily oriented
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towards the antisurface role, with SSM
as the primary weapon. Since 1967, the
emphasis has swung sharply to ASW,
with additional priority being given to
self-protection weapon systems on the
larger surface ships. Except for one class
of four ships (the rump of a cancelled
program), all new construction major
surface units which have entered service
since 1962 are now designated by the
Russians as large antisubmarine ships,
the Moskva and Kiev classes being called
antisubmarine cruisers. Two older
classes of SSM-armed surface ships have
undergone major conversion and have
been redesignated as large antisubmarine
ships. U.S. officials now refer to both
Moskva and Kiev as "ASW carriers," and
they have also acknowledged that the
missile launcher tubes in Kara (called a
cruiser in the West) carry antisubmarine
weapons and not SSM, as had previously
been thought. I assess that this also
applies to the other three classes of new
construction large antisubmarine ships,
which have entered service since 1966.s
Despite the shift to forward deployment, the Soviets are still building a
navy for a narrowly defined, defensive
mission, tailored for general war. If
anything, this tendency is likely to
increase as they continue striving to
develop an effective counter to Polaris,
Poseidon and then Trident. The construction of distant-water surface warships proceeds at a modest pace-about
two cruiser-size and two destroyer-size
large antisubmarine ships a year, and an
ASW carrier every two-and one has the
impression of an interim expedient,
while the final answer to the problem is
being developed. Submarines are a different matter and nuclear construction
proceeds remorselessly at 10 units a
year, while a new diesel program is also
underway. The Soviet submarine force
now comprises the primary antisurface
capability and SSM-armed submarines
operate in company with Soviet surface
forces. This makes a powerful team,
but its capabilities lie at the high end

of the spectrum of force and it lacks
any projection capability.
Although the presence of Soviet
naval forces in distant sea areas increases
the possibility of their use to hamper
Western military intervention, the past
10 years provide evidence of Soviet
caution on this score. Of greater significance is the future role of the new
global weapon systems, and their potential as a deterrent to such operations.
The overall effect of these developments in the law of the sea, advances in
weapon technology and proliferation of
sophisticated weapon systems, has been
to make the sea a much more complex
and potentially hostile operating environment. Attempts to prevent use
have become more likely, and the
capability to do so is much more widespread. The near monopoly of naval
power enjoyed by the West during the
first two postwar decades has been
steadily eroded. The reach of coastal
states is being progressively extended
and regional navies are beginning to
emerge in such areas as the Arabian and
China Seas, and the western South
Atlantic. These developments do not
imply that the U.S. Navy will lack the
capability to project military power in
distant parts of the world, or to secure
the use of the sea for such purposes. Its
ships were designed for war with Russia
and should be able to operate in the
face of Soviet hand-me-downs and suboptimal Western systems. But it does
mean that the deployment of naval
forces will need to be less of an instinctive reaction and will have to take more
factors into account, including the
possibility of losses. It also means that
self-protection systems will need to be
given higher priority in each ship's
weapons outfit.
The Costs of Military Intervention by
Sea. Military intervention can be coercive or supportive. 9 The distinction is
not entirely clear-cut, since in the case
of supportive intervention, the other
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party can claim he is being coerced (e.g.,
North Vietnam), and in a coercive intervention, a third party may be supported
indirectly (e.g., Pakistan in the 1971
Bangladesh war). The distinction is,
however, useful, because of the different levels of capability required for the
different types of intervention, both on
land and at sea.
The proximate aim of maritime intervention is either to secure the use of the
sea, or to prevent its use. Preventing use
is a relatively simple concept and we
have as examples the U.S. blockade of
Cuba in 1962, the mining of Hanoi in
1972, and Britain's Beira patrol aimed
at Rhodesia. These were all coercive. A
supportive intervention of this type is
the Guinea Patrol, established by the
Soviet Navy in November 1970, to
discourage further seaborne attacks on
Conakry. Except for the Cuban blockade, all these interventions were by
nonadjacent powers.
(1) The Terminal Area. The concept
of securing the use of the sea is more
complex, raising the question of "use
for what?" and sending us back to the
categories in our box diagram. Focusing
first on the projection of force ashore in
the terminal area, we need to distinguish
between coercive and supportive intervention, and to know whether or not
ground forces are involved. In the case
of coercive intervention, the maritime
environment will be hostile and where
troops have to be landed and kept
supplied by sea, it will be necessary for
the Navy to secure command of the
offshore zone and to be responsible for
air superiority, until airfields are established ashore. In constricted waters, the
need to cauterize possible threats and
forestall a surprise attack, will inevitably
incur additonal political costs, particularly if other states are close set, as for
example in the Persian Gulf. However, if
coercive intervention is limited to
"punishment" by strikes from ships
lying offshore, effective force defense

systems may be all that is necessary,
unless faced by a strong opponent and
unfavorable geography.
Supportive intervention is a very
different matter, involving much lower
risks and costs, even when ground forces
are engaged. The presence of a friendly
coastline and the availability of shore
facilities for coastal surveillance systems
and air support are important assets.
When ground forces are not involved,
the Navy's role is to bring prepackaged
firepower to bear on the area of conflict. At the present time, this mainly
involves airborne systems, and these can
be used in various ways ranging from air
defense to reconnaissance and close
ground support, with the carrier serving
as an offshore airfield. But the advent of
precision-guided weapons and rocketaided shells may mean that gunfire
support from surface ships will gain a
new lease of life.
Involvement by three or more parties
in the terminal area is becoming increasingly likely. When support is being given
to one side of a local conflict, the
temptation for the other side to attack
the intervenor is very strong. Whether
this temptation is kept.in check will
depend on the other side's capability for
effective action, its fear of the consequences, and any external political constraints which may exist. Western "sanctuary" theory has never been very persuasive and the spread of potent
weapons, the existence of leaders like
Qdaffi and Amin, and, where submarines and missiles are concerned, the
difficulties of pinning down responsibility, all combine to make it unwise for
major powers to assume that smaller
nations whose interests are threatened,
will not dare to retaliate. Outside
powers who are not parties to the local
dispute may also become involved. For
example, the emerging regional powers
may react against external intrusion into
an area where they themselves are competing for influence. But the more
interesting case is involvement by other
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superpowers, and the prospects for this
type of confrontation and its consequences are discussed in the following
section.
So much for the terminal area. But
to intervene, one must first get there in
time to achieve one's purpose, and then
if necessary sustain the operation by
sea. This brings us to the question of
securing passage.
(2) Securing Passage. Narrow waters
or straits offer the best opportunities
for obstructing passage, and ignoring the
question of plausibility for the moment,
we can consider what ought to be done
to secure use, should that happen.
Ideally, the answer should stem from a
comparison of the political costs and
benefits of the possible courses of
action. We start with the political gains
that are supposed to accrue from the
main military intervention in the terminal area. Against this we set the political
costs of insisting on passage through the
narrow waterway against the wishes of
the littoral state(s), which may involve a
subsidiary military intervention. And if
there is an alternative way of getting to
the terminal area, we assess the political
and economic costs of accepting such a
diversion.
The political costs of forcing passage
must depend on the particular circumstances, but to some extent it will
reflect the bloodiness of the battle. This
will stem from military factors such as
relative capabilities, distance from land,
length of time within range of attack,
capacity for point defense, depth of
water, the likelihood of third-party
intervention and the type of land-based
weapons available to the littoral state.
There is also the type of use. It is one
thing to burst through deepwater straits
with a carrier group; it is another to
laboriously sweep a passage through
mined waters within artillery range of
land; and to secure a continuous flow of
shipping through hostile narrow waters
is very hard to achieve, and probably

requires that key points on the coast be
occupied. One can postulate a general
relationship between the costs of
forcing a passage in peacetime, and the
depth and width of the waterway and
the time in transit. To force a long
passage through narrow, shallow waters
is likely to have high political costs,
which stem mainly from the need to
take action against the national territory
of the littoral states.
( :3 ) Accepting Diversion. Setting
aside questions of "prestige" and
"precedent," the costs of accepting
diversion will depend on the extra distances involved. This can be expressed
in time and money, and will translate
into economic and political costs. In
most cases, the costs will be predominantly economic (although these may
have domestic implications), but external political costs will be incurred in
a time-urgent situation. Russia would be
faced with such a situation in the event
of war with China, since she would
almost certainly have to supply her Far
Eastern front by sea. The length of the
delay before the regular flow of supplies
began to arrive in the Far East would be
directly related to the length of passage,
and Russia has a vital interest in ensuring that the shortest route (Suez
Canal and Malacca Strait) is not obstructed. The next shortest route (via
Panama) is half as long again. In the case
of the United States, it is more likely to
involve the reactive deployment of a
carrier force from the Pacific into the
Indian Ocean, in circumstances where
the fate of a client regime depends on
support arriving within a limited period
of time. But in this example, the political costs can be translated into economic costs in the longer run. If it were
essential to be able to intervene in both
the Indian Ocean and the Western
Pacific, extra carriers could be procured
and deployed on both sides of the
archipelagic barrier.
In all other circumstances, time and
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distance can usually be translated into
dollars and cents straightaway. In pre·
planned military interventions, the extra
distance can be covered by looking
ahead and sailing earlier. Cyclical de·
ployments like Polaris patrols can be
handled by increasing the number of
units, reducing time in rest and maintenance, or changing crews in the forward area. Continuous flow operations
like logistic support and military supply
can be met by placing additional bottoms in the shipping pipeline.
We cannot rule on the comparative
cost-benefit balance without knowing
the particular circumstances. But it
would seem that when timeliness is not
a problem and when an alternative route
exists, even if it is twice as long, the
costs of accepting a diversion while
negotiating the use of a waterway, are
likely to be considerably less than those
incurred in forcing passage. Even when
time is critical the costs must be
weighed carefully against the benefits to
be achieved at the far end.
For the same general reasons, the
denial of passage to commercial
shipping will rarely justify the costs of
military intervention. Not only can the
merchant ships usually be diverted, but
it is also possible to send the goods by
other means such as pipeline, rail or
road. Where shipping continues to be
used, it is the relative increase in distance which is important and its effect
on shipping costs as a share of the final
price of the product. It is hard to
generalize about this, because although
there is a direct relationship between
the length of passage and the cost of
providing shipping services, the extent
to which the price of shipping actually
reflects these costs varies between
trades. However, shipping represents a
comparatively small proportion of the
total cost of imports, and as a general
rule, the effect of making a major
diversion is likely to be no greater than
the effect of normal fluctuations in
commodity prices and charter rates. For

example, if we postulate that all the
straits through the Indonesian Archipelago are closed, and all shipping from
the Indian Ocean has to pass south
about Australia, and then make the
worst case assumptions about freight
rates, this would only raise the cost of
living in Japan by under I percent. 1 0
And yet 40 percent of Japan's imports
normally pass through these straits, including 80 percent of her oil. There
would, of course, be some dislocation of
supplies while the first ships steamed
the longer routes, but there are
numerous examples of how rapidly
international trade adapts to new
circumstances, and dislocations are
likely to be temporary.
(4) Obstructions to Passage. How
likely is it that littoral states would seek
to prevent the use of narrow waterways? In most cases, they have a vested
interest in the continuous flow of trade
and shipping through these waters, and
their economies would be damaged by a
prolonged diversion. The closest precedent is the blocking of the Suez Canal
by Egypt in 1956, but this was in
response to an Anglo-French assault.
Littoral states may wish to use their
monopoly power to extract rent from a
geographical asset, and might threaten
various restrictions if their demands
were not met. But so far their position
in this regard has been moderate, reflecting reasonable concerns for the
dangers inherent in the passage of very
large crude carriers and comparable
ships through narrow waters, and the
devastation it could cause to their
shores. In this they can expect a fair
amount of international support. But
there would be little for a general toll
on all types of cargo, because most
countries now have a vested interest in
lower shipping costs. An unprovoked
attempt to hold the international
community to ransom by preventing use
of such waterways would be bound
to leave the littoral states worse off
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than when they started, and undoubtedly they appreciate this.
Provocation is another matter. National sovereignty is such a sensitive
attribute among newly emergent nations
that its infringement would be accepted
as due cause by many of the less
developed countries, even if their consequential actions damaged their immediate interests. For this reason, the passage of warships, amphibious forces and
military supplies falls into a different
category to normal trade, particularly
when the forces are intended for use
against some friend of the littoral state,
or in support of some enemy. We have
seen the use of the oil weapon to bring
pressure on Western nations during the
Arab-Israeli war, which had tactical as
well as strategic consequences. Denial of
passage through strategic waterways
could be used in the same way. Whether
it would is another matter. Turning off
the oil did no damage to the supplying
countries; rather the reverse. But a
littoral state which sought to prevent
the passage of U.S. forces would have to
assume that its territory would be
attacked. While it is true that not all
states speak the language of interest,
and that when international passions are
roused, reactions tend to be unpredictable, that would still be a heavy price to
pay in support of a distant state and the
diffuse aims of a loose ideological bloc.
The degree of political commitment
is central to the use of force, which is
why attempts to prevent the passage of
military supplies are more likely in the
terminal area. The absence of such
attempts in the past probably reflects a
lack of capability rather than the will to
make the attempt. And in the case of
Vietnam, it seems likely that the Soviet
Union did not wish to jeopardize her
maritime supply line to Haiphong, lest
Hanoi be forced to rely on overland
support from China. However, the U.S.
mining of Haiphong has now "legitimized" a whole new range of actions in
the terminal area, and in future conflicts

the client state may be provided with
the means to interfere with the shipment of military supplies.
This leads to the question of whether
military intervention is likely against the
ocean waterways. To start with the
more general case of international trade,
it is sometimes argued that because the
West is so depenclent on the shipment of
oil from the Middle East, therefore the
Soviet Union will be tempted to attack
the line of supply; this is a modern
variant of the more venerable bogey
that because Europe depends heavily on
imports, therefore it would be in
Russia's interests to initiate submarine
commerce war in the North Atlantic.
This is a classic example of the fallacy
that what hurts oneself must help one's
enemy, and can be shown to be implausible for a whole range of reasons.
Outside the circumstances of world war,
it is near impossible to identify circumstances in which it would be in the
Soviet Union's interests to initiate
commerce war, least of all in the
Arabian Sea. The reasons range from
comparative military capability to
political and economic costs and alternative instruments of policy, and
include Russia's own interest in maritime stability and freedom of the seas,
which still remain largely within the gift
of the West. I I In general, the diffuse
nature of international seaborne trade is
its own best protection, since most
nations have an interest in the principle
of safe passage for merchant ships in
peacetime. Meanwhile, as the number of
national merchant fleets grows, so too
does the extent to which all ships are in
hostage to each other.
The shipment of IDuitary supplies is a
different matter. So far, the convention
has been observed that attacks on the
lines of supply have been limited to the
territory and coastal waters of the primary belligerents or client states. With
the growing number of states possessing
submarines, it is not certain that this
convention will hold. The United States
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went close to breaching it during the
Cuban missile crisis, but this could be
justified by the nature of the Soviet
initiative, and on the grounds that Cuba
was within the American national
security zone. But the latter justification can be claimed by China in its
adjacent sea areas, and it now has a
force of more than 70 submarines.
While the midocean interdiction of military supply lines remains unlikely, the
probability is therefore increasing that
they will be liable to attack or other
forms of interference as they near the
terminal areas.
Maritime Intervention and the Superpowers.
(1) The United States. Russia and
America have somewhat -different
approaches to overseas intervention,
both in their historical experience and
in their current assessments. I will not
dwell on the American case except to
note that she was both the offspring and
the inheritor of Western attitudes, experience and tradition in this area, to
which she then added her own. Since
the end of the 19th century, the U.S.
Navy has been an important instrument
of policy, an instrument whose potential was vastly increased by its develop·
ment during World War II. America
ended the war as the world's paramount
power, with a Navy second to none and
soon found herself at the head of a
Western maritime coalition which had a
virtual monopoly of seapower, and this
was used to some effect in the following
decades. The U.S. Navy includes an
organic Air Force which for a long time
was the third largest in the world (after
the USAF and the Soviet force), and a
Marine Corps which is larger and better
armed than most national armies. The
"peacetime" employment of naval
forces has been a dominant consideration and has generated its own substantial force requirements. During the
past 30 years there has probably been

a greater use of navies in this way than
at any comparable period.
(2) The Soviet Union. Russian naval
history goes back to before America
gained her independence. But traditionally, the navy has been seen as an
expensive necessity, rather than as an
instrument of worldwide policy. From
the first half of the 19th century,
Russia's naval policy was increasingly
dominated by the requirement to de·
fend four widely separated fleet areas
against maritime powers who could concentrate their forces at will. This same
attitude persists in the present-day
Soviet Union, where the defense estab·
lishment is dominated by ground force
officers and where there appear to be
considerable doubts about the value of
military intervention overseas. This is
reflected in the shape of the Soviet
Navy, which lacks a distant-water intervention capability and is structured for
the war-related task of posing a permanent counter to the West's seaborne
strategic delivery systems. The primary
maritime instrument of foreign policy is
the merchant fleet, which carries trade,
aid and arms supplies to client states
and other countries, and whose well·
disciplined crews project the Soviet
presence ashore. 1 2
(3) The Overseas Role of a Soviet
Military Presence. It would, however,
seem that between 1969 and 1973,
there was a sustained debate within the
Soviet Union concerning the use of
armed forces in support of international
goals. 1 3 The causes and the results of
this debate are still obscure, but it
appears that in 1969, under pressure of
the rapidly deteriorating situation in
Egypt, the political leadership agreed to
commit Soviet armed forces overseas,
thus taking the first step down the road
of a traditional Western·style policy
towards the projection of military
power. This major policy decision was
followed by the deployment of Soviet
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air defense systems to Egypt in the
spring of 1970. It would appear, however, that as events unfolded and as the
costs and implications of such involvement became clearer, the arguments of
those who opposed the original shift in
policy were strengthened, until they
were able to reverse the deployment
decision. However, the final policy on
the role of a "Soviet military presence"
had yet to be agreed, and it seems that
the debate continued for a further
12-15 months until a compromise was
reached. By May 1973, it appears to
have been decided that direct Soviet
involvement overseas would be limited
to the provision of advisers, weapons
and strategic logistic support, the combat role being delegated to the Sovietequipped forces of "revolutionary"
states such as North Korea,Vietnam and
Cuba.
The outcome appears to be a policy
which ensures the Soviet Union the best
of both worlds; namely, being able to
affect the outcome of an overseas conflict with direct battlefield support,
while ensuring that political commitment and liability remain strictly
limited. This is achieved by (a) facilitating the arrangements and providing
the lift to bring cobelligerent forces to
the zone of conflict; (b) ensuring that
the client state or regime receives adequate military supplies in the course of
the battle; and (c) remaining silent
about Soviet involvement until success
is assured. Of course, a corollary of such
a policy is that it only allows the
supportive use of Soviet military force;
the coercive use must be achieved
through proxies.
In terms of force projection, the
major instruments of this policy appear
to be the merchant fleet and the military and civil air transport fleets. The
Soviet Navy has made some contribution, as for example the sealift of
Moroccan troops by landing ship to
Syria in April and July 1973, the use of
landing ships to ferry military supplies

from the Black Sea to Syria during the
October 1973 war, and the use of the
landing ships based on Berbera to move
supporters of the Dhofari rebellion to
Oman. This naval contribution is marginal by comparison with men and
supplies shipped by other means, and
the emphasis on the peacetime employment of Soviet naval forces is in other
directions.
(4) The Navy's Peacetime Role. The
1967 Arab-Israeli war, which gave the
Soviet Navy its much-needed access to
Egyptian shore facilities, also marked
the start of the second and more distant
phase of the shift to forward deployment, as Soviet naval forces moved out
into the Caribbean, off the west coast of
Africa and into the northwest quadrant
of the Indian Ocean. Thereafter, political exploitation of the presence of
Soviet warships in distant sea areas
steadily increased. In 1970 there was a
marked change in the trend, with naval
detachments being deployed specifically
for peacetime (as opposed to warrelated) tasks, but this activity leveled
off in 1972-73. Soviet pronouncements
refer to the navy's peacetime role in
general terms as "defending (or securing) state interests," a nebulous formulation, whose scope has yet to be
systematically researched. While not
losing sight of the all-encompassing
scope of this phrase, it 'is useful to
discuss Soviet naval activity in terms of
four major categories: establishing a
strategic infrastructure; countering
imperialist aggression; increasing prestige and influence; and protecting Soviet
lives and property.
The first and most important category covers the task of establishing the
physical, political and operational infrastructure required to support two quite
distinct war-related tasks, namely:
posing a permanent counter in peacetime to Western sea-based strategic
delivery systems; and securing the safe
and timely arrival of military supplies to
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the Far Eastern front, in the event of
war with China. I 4
The geographical extent of the first
requirement can be seen by drawing
1,500 n.m. and 2,500 n.m. circles centered on Moscow, which show the arcs
of threat from the Polaris A-2 and A-3
missiles. The smaller circle takes in the
South Norwegian Sea and the Eastern
Mediterranean and explains the heavy
pressure brought on Egypt from 1961
onwards, to provide base facilities to
support the Soviet Navy's forward deployment.15 The larger circle takes in
the eastern half of the Atlantic and
much of the Arabian Sea, running from
the tip of Greenland to cut the west
coast of Africa abreast the Cape Verde
Islands, and crossing the Indian Ocean
between the Hom of Africa and Bombay. This explains the Soviet Union's
persistent interest in the politically
insignificant West African states, and
her initial move into Somalia in 1969,
despite the latter's talent for acquiring
political enemies both in Africa and on
the Arabian peninsula.16 Meanwhile,
Cuba gives access to the departure ports
on the east coast of the United States,
and (with West Africa) covers the sea
lines of communication with the Mediterranean.
The second strategic requirement, to
secure the sea lines of communication
with the Far East front, explains the
increased involvement in Somalia which
followed after Marshal Grechko's visit in
February . 1972. Concern about the
Chinese threat in the Far East began to
crystallize after the 9th Congress of the
Chinese Communist Party in April
1969; this saw the emergence of what
the Soviets perceived as a militarybureaucratic elite which was basically
antagonistic to Russia. Following the
series of incidents on the Ussuri River,
the Soviet Union increased the buildup
of its forces in the border region of
China, and presumably this would have
prompted a review of the arrangements
for logistic support in the event of war.

Reliance could not be placed on the
Trans-Siberian Railway and supplies
would have to be shipped by sea. The
reasons for shifting the Soviet focus
from Egypt to Somalia are likely to be
similar to those which prompted the
British to start constructing a major
base in Kenya in the late 1940's, as an
alternative to the existing one in the
Canal Zone. The decision to build up
the Somalian facilities was taken at least
6 months before the withdrawal from
Egypt, and it seems likely that Sadat's
request suited the Soviet's purposes.1 7
Turning to the second category of
"countering imperialist aggression," we
should note that in the Soviet lexicon
"imperialist aggression" includes the
deployment of tr.S. sea-based systems
within range of Russia. Because of the
very different type of political commitment involved, it is important to distinguish between the war-related task of
posing a permanent counter to such
systems, and the peacetime task of
opposing/challenging Western military
intervention against "progressive states"
and "national liberation movements."
In areas such as the Eastern Mediterranean, where additional naval forces
were deployed during the 1967, 1970
and 1973 crises, this peacetime task is
upstaged by the more important warrelated task of countering the U.S.
carriers nuclear strike potential and,
until the dangers of escalation were
past, Soviet naval units unmistakably
had this as their only priority during the
first two crises. During the 1973 crisis,
in addition to the carriers, they targeted
the Sixth Fleet's amphibious forces,18
and this may have been intended to
deter the United States from committing ground forces to the battle
ashore. There is, however, an equally
plausible war-related explanation. The
Soviets plan to seize the Black Sea exits
at the outbreak of a major conflict, and
their Mediterranean squadron has the
additional task of preventing the Sixth
Fleet from reinforcing the defense of
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the Turkish straits. 1 9 The primary mission during the 1973 crisis therefore
remains uncertain.
The first clear example of the peacetime task of "countering imperialist
aggression" was the establishment of the
"Guinea Patrol" in December 1970,
apparently to deter further Portuguesesupported seaborne attacks on Conakry.
The next example was the dispatch of
Soviet naval detachments to the Indian
Ocean in December 1971, in reaction to
the deployment of British and U.S.
carrier task forces prior to and during
the Indo-Pakistan war. The most recent
example was during the Angolan affair,
when a Kresta class large antisubmarine
ship was deployed south of Guinea and
on past practice, one would assume that
it had SSM-armed submarines in company. This placed the detachment in a
blocking position between Angola and
U.S. naval forces in the North Atlantic.
The other two categories are of lesser
interest to this discussion. The task of
"increasing Soviet prestige and, influence" assumed a new dimension in
1972, when the Soviet Navy undertook
port clearing operations in Bangladesh,
and it was also used to sweep the
southern approaches to Suez in 1974.
The navy's role in "protecting Soviet
lives and property overseas" is best
exemplified by the landing ships which
take up station off Syria and Egypt
when war breaks out with Israel, and off
Angola in the 1976 conflict, and it
appears that their task is to evacuate
Soviet personnel if defeat is imminent.
The only other example is the deployment of three warships to Ghanaian
waters in 1969, which may have helped
effect the release of two Soviet trawlers
that had been held for over 4 months on
conspiracy charges.
Any particular operation may further
the objectives of more than one of these
four peacetime tasks. The continuation
of the Guinea Patrol after the Portuguese threat evaporated in 1974, suggests that its primary justification may

in fact have been to "establish the
geostrategic infrastructure" by securing
access to base facilities on the west
coast of Africa. The same general objective may also have prompted the
Ghanaian episode in 1969 and the
politically timed visit to Sierra Leone in
1971.20
(5) Political Commitment to Peacetime Tasks. It can be seen that the
Soviet Navy's war-related task and its
three main peacetime tasks are all intended to promote the two primary
objectives of Soviet foreign policy.· In
order of priority, these are (1) to ensure
the security of the Soviet Union, and
(2) to increase the Soviet Union's share
of world power and influence. It is
useful to distinguish the peacetime employments of Soviet naval forces in this
manner, because it clarifies the level of
political commitment behind different
types of interest and operation.
It is quite evident from their pronouncements, from the output of their
defense production programs, and from
the pattern of naval operations, that the
Soviet Union gives high priority to the
task of countering Western sea-based
strategic delivery systems. To support
this task they have been willing in the
past to accept new political costs and
commitments. Many of the paradoxes in
the Soviet-Egyptian relationship since
1961 can be explained by allowing that
the Soviet Union had a near vital interest in gaining access to shore facilities
whereby to support her counterforce
naval deployment in the Eastern Mediterranean. It is possible that there may
now be somewhat less willingness to
accept large political costs on this score:
partly because of SALT-generated
changes in Soviet perceptions of the
threat of nuclear war; partly because
war with China is now the more likely
contingency; and perhaps partly because
the new global all-arms weapon systems
will soon be entering service and will
relieve the dependence on shore support
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in the forward operating areas. But the
task still stands, and since it contributes
to the security of the Soviet Union, the
level of political commitment to securing the necessary geostrategic infrastructure will be of a different order to other
types of overseas involvement.
"Countering imperialist aggression"
is a different matter, and the level of
political commitment to this task has
never been very clear. Certainly it is not
worth risking war with America, which
would violate the first priority objective
of ensuring the security of the Soviet
Union. But Soviet perceptions of the
dangers of escalation may have been
modified by the SALT negotiations,
increasing their readiness to risk confrontation at sea, in pursuit of overseas
goals. And this brings us back to the
possibility and risks of involvement by
the second superpower, in a military
intervention initiated by the first. The
later stages of the Angolan affair provide an example of one kind of situation. This was an overt, supportive
intervention, initiated by the Soviet
Union using proxy forces and shipping a
large volume of military supplies by sea.
The U.S. Navy certainly had the capability to impose a stop-and-search blockade on Angola in order to prevent this
flow of supplies, but in fact took no
action. Presumably to discourage any
such interference, the Soviets deployed
a Kresta and one or more cruise-missilearmed submarines in a blocking position. Certain points can be made. First,
the nature of Soviet interests in Angola
were not such as to justify the sinking
of a U.S. warship on the high seas,
particularly not a carrier, and a blockading force could have sailed through
the Soviet patrol line with impunity.
Second, the long-term political costs to
the United States of imposing such a
blockade would have been very high. It
would have demonstrated to the Soviet
leadership that Gorshkov was right
when he argued that a powerful generalpurpose fleet was the essential foun-

dation of an independent overseas
policy; it would have encouraged a shift
in the allocation of resources in favor of
increased naval building programs, and
the construction of a large, balanced
surface fleet, including aircraft carriers.
Such costs could hardly be justified by
the U.S. interests at stake. And third, in
order to shape the Soviet Union's future
expectations, what the United States
could have done was to have dispatched
a force of ships to sail through the
Soviet patrol line, reverse course and
return home, thereby showing that the
U.S. Navy was not intimidated. As it
happens, the Atlantic Fleet was engaged
in other operations and was instructed
to ignore the Soviet deployment; this
was the next best thing, but still a long
way short of optimal.
(6) Soviet-U.S. Confrontation at
Sea. But besides political commitment,
there is also the question of effective
military capability. The deployment of
a U.S. carrier task force to the Indian
Ocean in December 1971 during the
Indo-Pakistan war may have been counterproductive in political terms, but at
least the force had a demonstrable
military capability, which could be used
if so wished. Not so in the Soviet case,
despite the missile armament of their
surface ships and submarines. Under
what circumstances would these units
have been ordered to attack the carrier?
As soon as it readied its aircraft for
takeoff to an unknown destination with
an unknown weapon load? Or perhaps
only after the aircraft had struck some
target ashore? Perhaps the Soviet Union
could claim they got some political
mileage out of this operation, although
they certainly risked being exposed as
paper tigers. But their next deployment,
in response to the mining of Haiphong
was both militarily and politically pointless; a fairly substantial force of surface
ships and submarines sailed to the South
China Sea, hung around for a few days,
and then returned home. There was
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nothing effective that they could do.
I am not persuaded by the suggestion
that there now exists a set of tacit
"rules" for the peacetime employment
of naval force, which apply equally to
the Soviet Union and the United
States.21 The two powers have different
levels of naval capability and very different interests and types of commitment. Special account must be taken of
Soviet interests in those areas of geostrategic importance to the security of
the Russian homeland. But in most
other circumstances, I consider that
Soviet action at sea is largely conditioned by their estimate of U.S. reactions, and as a general rule, the low
level of Soviet commitment to "countering imperialist aggression" does not
justify risking confrontation.
The Soviet impulse to "counter imperialist aggression" is a longstanding
one, as can be seen by the pattern of
Soviet arms supply in the 1950's and
1960's. So too is the Western impulse to
react against the emergence of left wing
regimes. And for many years, the situation could be described crudely in terms
of the West conducting a dogged rearguard action against change, while the
Soviet Union was the natural ally of historical trends. But we are now 30 years
down the road, there are few colonial
territories left, and whatever their political complexion, the newly independent
states have national interests and wills
of their own. The old ideological
reasons for military intervention by the
two superpowers have largely evaporated, and it now becomes a question of
picking sides in a traditional civil or
interstate war. Given the transitory
nature of political alignments, this
would seem hardly worth the risks and
costs involved. In the future, we may
find that the main role of superpower
intervention is to protect smaller states
from the hegemonic tendencies of the
emerging regional powers.
There remains, however, the problem
of Southern Africa. Although the West

is unhappy with the dominant white
regimes, kith-and-kin and cultural factors constrain the type of support it is
willing to afford the movement towards
Black liberation, an ambivalence which
provides excellent opportunities for
Soviet influence-building. The possibilities for their involvement are manifold,
ranging from the supply of arms, to
mounting a naval blockade to enforce a
United Nations resolution on mandatory sanctions. Given that the area is
remote from both Russia and the
United States, and allowing that the
Soviet Union may have downgraded the
risks of escalation to general war, the
pressures for an assertive policy will be
strong, increasing the possibility of
serious EastlWest confrontation.
Overview. The maritime aspects of
military intervention is too diffuse a
subject to draw together in a few well
chosen words, and to have discussed the
problem without having addressed the
prior question of the utility of military
force, is like describing the mechanics of
a religion without referring to its God.
Certain points can, however, be made.
The most obvious is that we now
have a situation which is infinitely more
complicated than that facing Palmerston
in the heyday of gunboat diplomacy.
For a start, the maritime environment is
much more complex. We have the diffusion of sophisticated weapon systems;
the increased "reach" of coastal states; a
change in international attitudes
towards the rights of passage and the
ownership of the sea; and the
appearance of new "global" weapons
for tactical use.
The political environment is also
much more complex. We have just
passed through 30 years of radical
change, which saw the dismantling of
the Western colonial empires and an
ideological competition for the favor of
the newly emerging nations. We are now
faced with an international system
whose structure is hard to discern, with
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a change in the nature of usable power
and its distribution, and with a range of
threats to human survival which _are
altering national and international
priorities and goals. Attitudes toward
the use of coercive force by Great
Powers have altered fundamentally, and
new states do not "respond" to the
threat of violence in the formerly
accepted fashion.
Missiles do not know their mums,
and the proliferation of modern weapons means that an increasing number of
coastal states has some capability to
prevent the use of their seas by both
superpowers; narrow, shallow waterways are particularly vulnerable. The
change in political attitudes means that
maritime powers can no longer count on
being able to use the seas unhindered
for maritime intervention, and the terminal leg of the sea lines of supply are
now liable to attack. Meanwhile the
political costs of forcing a passage
through narrow waterways are likely to
be so high that it is usually better to
take an alternative route, where one
exists, except when major interests are
engaged and timeliness an issue. The
economic costs of such diversion are
generally less than would be expected.
The utility of coercive intervention is
increasingly in doubt, except for short,
sharp, small-scale, rectifying operations,
and possibly at the other end of the
spectrum of violence, where the scale of
operations changes "intervention" into
"overseas war." Supportive intervention
has a better record, but the increasing
costs and risks raise the question of
whether navies are necessarily the most
effective instrument for such purposes.
Aircraft carriers have an unmatched
capability for bringing flexible firepower to bear in distant areas, but their
high political symbolism and their need
for sea room, place constraints on their
unfettered use. Meanwhile the Russians
have shown what can be done with
merchant ships and airlift, making use
of facilities in the,host country.

Many of the attributes which in former times were the monopoly of naval
forces, and gave them their special value
as instruments of foreign policy, have
now been dissipated or are shared by
other instruments. The international
news media and satellite surveillance
mean that knowledge of warship movements is no longer in the flag state's
control, to be released (or not) as
circumstances dictate. Naval units can
no longer deploy the graduated range of
violence that used to be at their disposal, and the level of force needed to
acllieve comparable results is very much
higher. Violence (punishment) at the
high end of the spectrum can now be inflicted on nonadjacent areas by aircraft
and missiles, as well as by ship. In fact
the air is often a viable, alternative
means of gaining access to distant areas,
and the response time is of quite a different order. Modem communications
allow heads of state and other ministers
to communicate their concerns, interests and intentions to their opponents in
carefully chosen language, which compares favorably with the crude signaling
of naval deployments. And this explicit
language can now be backed by latent
force emplaced ashore.
The latter is perhaps one of the more
interesting possibilities which lie ahead.
The advent of global systems which can
deliver tactical weapons, opens up new
ways of preventing the use of the sea or
of providing direct support in distant
parts of the world. In practical terms,
there is not much difference between
sinking a carrier with a salvo of torpedoes, a 300-mile SSM or a 3,OOO-mile
terminally guided ballistic missile. It is
illogical to be concerned about two of
these possibilities and to ignore the
third; the difficulty of countering the
ballistic missile makes it the much more
potent threat.
Despite these constraints and complexities, in the foreseeable future there
will continue to be situations where the
sea will be the most appropriate means
I
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of bringing traditional military force to
bear in distant areas of the world.
Changing circumstances will encourage
progressive developments in the size and
characteristics of naval units employed
in this capacity, with particular emphasis on reducing the vulnerability and
political salience of individual units.
While making it lass likely that such
units will be disabled, this will reduce
the political costs if they are, and hence
increase the general usefulness of this
instrument.
These changes in hardware will
probably be easier to achieve than the
even more necessary changes in traditional attitudes towards the role of
naval force as an instrument of peacetime foreign policy. "Send a Gunboat"
can now do as much harm as good and
the advantages of timeliness have to be
weighed against the political costs inherent in forward deployment. The
Soviet presence in distant sea areas such

as the Indian Ocean demands a careful
evaluation of the costs and benefits of
matching such deployments, compared
with those of doing nothing and using
the Soviet presence as a stick in the
psychological competition for world
influence. There is an urgent need for
more selectivity in the type of naval
force deployed and the occasions on
which it is deployed. Carriers, which
will continue to be operational through
the tum of the century at least, are
likely to be reserved for use in major
planned interventions, involving substantial forces and political commitment. Their more general role will be to
contribute to the worldwide naval
balance as a capability in being.
Military intervention by sea will persist as an instrument of Great Power
policy, but there are likely to be considerable changes both in its character
and in its relative importance.
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